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A new measure of firm-level competition: an application to euro area banks

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Abstract

Key Points: 
    • Abstract
      This paper extends Boone (2008) by introducing a competition measure at the individual
      firm level rather than for an entire market segment.
    • We apply this extended Boone indicator to individual bank-level competition
      in the loan market in the four largest euro area countries and Austria.
    • Our new measure of firm-level competition enriches and complements
      other competition measures and provides a promising starting point for future market
      power analyses.
    • The only measure among non-structural measures that is based on the
      concept of competition as a process of rivalry is the Boone (2008) indicator.
    • We introduce
      a new performance measure of competition by extending the Boone indicator to the
      individual firm level.
    • Introduction
      The ability to reliably measure competition is valuable to researchers, analysts, and
      policymakers, especially antitrust authorities, financial supervisors, and central banks.
    • One broad
      category of indicators often used to measure competition are structural competition
      measures, such as static concentration measures, and dynamic measures, e.g., entry and
      exit rates.
    • Out of these measures, the only measure based on the
      concept of competition as a process of rivalry is the Boone indicator.
    • This study introduces a new performance measure of competition by extending the
      Boone indicator to the individual firm level.
    • It thus measures the
      increase in profits in percent of one percentage point increase in efficiency, with marginal
      costs as measure of efficiency.
    • We extend the theoretical
      underpinning of the measurement of competition for the entire market of Boone (2008) by
      a new measure of individual firm-level competition.
    • A concern of the literature is the gap
      between the practical application and the theoretical framework of Boone (2008).
    • We introduce within the same theoretical
      framework a new measure of competition on firm level, the MRP.
    • Our new
      measure significantly augments the antitrust evaluative framework by shedding light on
      whether a merger results in a less competitive market.
    • Our novel indicator focuses on
      firms? incentives to enhance their relative efficiency, as manifested in the elasticity
      between relative profits and efficiency.
    • However, an inefficient firm that is foreclosed could be more
      competitive than the larger efficient firm that relies on its scale economies.
    • Our new metric of competition unveils
      banks? ability to influence their profitability in the short term by cutting costs relative to
      their peers.
    • The new MRP indicator provides the ability to assess the impact
      of individual banks? competitiveness on their interest rate-setting behaviour in loan
      markets.
    • Incorporating this information promises a more refined understanding of the impact and
      timing of monetary policy rates changes on the real economy.
    • Section 3 introduces within the Boone
      (2008) theoretical framework our new measure of individual firm-level competition,
      including the interpretation of the MRP.
    • Section 4 provides an application of our new
      ECB Working Paper Series No 2925

      6

      individual firm-level competition measure to the loan market.

    • The StructureConduct-Performance paradigm (SCP) provides a traditional framework in the field of
      industrial organization for analysing competition behaviour in markets.
    • Concentrated
      markets ease the possibilities to collude implicitly or explicitly and therefore concentrated
      markets result in higher prices and profits.
    • For example, a tougher competition
      setup may lead to a reallocation of market shares, potentially forcing some firms to exit
      the market.
    • This approach gives firms? strategic behaviour
      central stage and focuses on the strategic interaction on prices and quantities, known as
      conjectural variation.
    • Another measure from
      this strand of literature is the H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987).
    • The only competition measure from this performance literature where competition is the
      outcome from a process of rivalry is the Boone indicator.
    • A continuous and monotonically increasing relationship exists between
      RPD and the level of competition if firms are ranked by decreasing efficiency.
    • (2013) compare the Boone indicator with the price-cost margin
      and conclude that the profit elasticity is a more reliable measure of competition.
    • The high
      elasticity of profits to efficiency unequivocally indicates that the high market shares and
      therefore high profits are due to high efficiency.
    • A firm that quickly passes changes to the input prices is seen as a price
      taker with little market power.
    • Indicators of competition tend to measure different phenomenon and may provide
      conflicting messages, as reported for European banking by Carbo et al.
    • Application 2: Test the ?quiet life? and related market structure hypotheses using the
      MRP as competition or market structure measure.
    • Data
      Our application to individual bank-level competition in the euro area loan market uses
      balance sheet and income statement data from the Moody?s Analytics BankFocus for the
      calendar years 2013-2020.
    • As such, most publications
      on competition in the euro area includes the largest four member states.
    • Due to these restrictions the database was reduced to an unbalanced panel of up to 1862
      banks (depending on the year) from five euro area countries.
    • Application 1: Measure bank competition using MRP
      Looking at the distribution of the MRP for individual banks (Fig.
    • A similar finding for the four largest euro area countries as a group is
      reported in Carbo et al.
    • Application 2: Test of market structure hypotheses using MRP
      Our new measure of individual-bank competition can be used to test market structure
      theories.
    • Euro area banks? market power,
      lending channel and stability: the effects of negative policy rates, European Central Bank
      Working Paper, 2790 (February).
    • A
      new approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro area, Applied
      Economics, 43 (23), 3155?3167.
    • Impact of bank competition on the interest rate pass-through in the euro area, Applied
      Economics, 45 (11), 1359?1380.