David Berger

Demographics, labor market power and the spatial equilibrium

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, February 13, 2024

Abstract

Key Points: 
    • Abstract
      This paper studies how demographics affect aggregate labor market power, the urban wage
      premium and the spatial concentration of population.
    • I develop a quantitative spatial model
      in which labor market competitiveness depends on the demographic composition of the local
      workforce.
    • If these factors differ across workers, labor market power has a role to
      play in explaining wage inequality.
    • This paper contributes to the literature on differences in labor market power by analyzing a
      new dimension of heterogeneity: demographics.
    • Since older workers are less mobile in terms of
      switching workplaces, firms have more labor market power over older workers.
    • I start by estimating labor market power by measuring the sensitivity of worker turnover to
      the wage paid.
    • I find a strong
      role of demographics in determining the degree of labor market power enjoyed by firms.
    • Next, I provide evidence of the importance of differences in labor market power for spatial
      wage inequality.
    • To explore the consequences of labor market sorting, I build a spatial general equilibrium
      model in which labor market competitiveness depends on the demographic composition of the

      ECB Working Paper Series No 2906

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      local workforce.

    • If these factors differ across workers, labor market power has a role to
      play in explaining wage inequality.
    • In
      the model, geographic sorting by age matters and leads to higher labor market power in rural
      areas, which implies an urban wage premium that is 4% larger than with uniform labor supply
      elasticities.
    • I follow Manning (2013) and estimate labor market power by measuring the sensitivity of worker
      turnover to the wage paid.
    • Bachmann et al., 2021; Ahlfeldt et al., 2022a; Berger et al.,
      2022) that nest a monopsonistic labor market in a spatial general equilibrium model (Redding
      and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017).
    • As firms have more labor market power
      over older workers, they face an upward-sloping labor supply curve that is less elastic in regions
      with an older workforce.
    • Firms choose in which labor market to operate in the sense that there is free
      entry at fixed costs into all locations.
    • How are differences in labor market competitiveness across space sustained in spatial equilibrium?
    • I use the model to quantify the importance of heterogeneity
      in labor market power for the urban wage premium and the spatial concentration of population.
    • My work is complementary to but quite different
      from this paper since I argue that population aging increases labor market power rather than
      product market power.
    • By analyzing the effects of a changing age composition of the workforce in the context
      of labor market power, I relate to literature on the labor market effects of population aging.
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      7

      after controlling for age, differences in labor market power between East and West Germany
      vanish.

    • They conclude that higher
      concentration is associated with higher labor market power (as in the model of Jarosch et al.,
      forthcoming).
    • I offer an alternative explanation why labor market power differs across regions:
      Since denser regions have a younger workforce, workers are more mobile in terms of switching
      jobs which implies lower labor market power of firms.
    • In this case, I infer a
      high labor supply elasticity and low labor market power of firms.
    • I contribute to this growing debate by
      quantifying differences in labor market power across worker groups and their effects on regional
      inequality.
    • While the model shows how demographics affect labor market power, the urban wage premium and agglomeration, one fundamental question remains open for future research: What
      are the policy implications of (differences in) labor market power?