Violence

• Supporters of Rwanda’s trajectory believe in the aspiration of its president, Paul Kagame, for the country to become Africa’s Singapore.
• Others denounce it as an ethnocracy, a state dominated by one ethnic group, and one run by a hyper-authoritarian dictatorship.
• I conclude that a contradiction exists at the heart of Rwanda’s state-building model, placing a question mark over the country’s future.

Rwanda’s legacy

• The persistent polarisation over Rwanda is partly the legacy of the country’s civil war that culminated in genocide (1990-94).
• Those who value democracy, civil liberties, justice and reconciliation find much wanting in post-genocide Rwanda.
• In contrast, those who think effective state institutions, socio-economic development and political stability are more important disagree and view Rwanda more favourably.
• There is also much more at stake in these assessments than just the fate of one small African state.
• The approach – narrative analysis coupled with active interviewing – is premised on the idea that some insight into Rwanda’s future stability may be gleaned.

to establish “consensus” over competitive politics
to systematically de-emphasize the importance of ethnicity in society
to modernise the state and use it to grow and diversify the economy.

Supporters and critics

• Strikingly, regime supporters cited the same two underlying rationales for each of these three choices: security and unity.
• Critics, however, offered different rationales.
• Lastly, in economics, critics argued the strategy pursued sought simply to entrench and enrich the ruling party.
• Supporters and critics then have opposing understandings of why these strategic choices have been made.

The bottom line

• The regime’s preoccupation with security is at odds with its desire for unity.
• It’s impossible to have “political consensus” without meaningful choice, yet choice is not compatible with coercion.
• Similarly, a post-ethnic society is not achievable if your choices reflect a fear of the enduring power of ethnicity in society.

Omar Shahabudin McDoom does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

• But what is the real state of young South Africans – defined as people below the age of 34 – after 30 years of democracy?
• My recent research paper tracing 30 years of analysing youth marginalisation has found that youth in South Africa, who make up 34.3% of the population, have not fared well under democracy.

Measuring marginalisation

• The survey recorded indicators like unemployment and level of education, as well as subjective views like feelings of alienation (not belonging in society).
• The results were arranged on a scale of how far some young people had been pushed to the margins of society.
• Comparing data from the 1992 and 2018 indices of youth marginalisation, the same proportion (5%) is clearly “lost” – scoring off the chart on virtually every indicator.
• In terms of how much potential South Africa has squandered, they represent an entire generation of opportunity lost to the country.

Marginalised but not lost

• As ever, they demonstrated their instrumental value to the adults controlling violence on various sides.
• Those same adults and the media spoke of a “lost generation” – specifically, black, male, urban youth.

Marginalisation over time

• In 1993, after first presenting to assembled youth organisations in 1992, we released the first iteration of the marginalisation index, Growing up Tough.
• Despite the belief of our church sponsors that no-one is ever truly “lost”, that became the central category of the index.
• In all, 5% of respondents scored high on all, or most, of the indicators in the 12 dimensions.
• Most of the items in the index were later used by the Gauteng City Region Observatory in its early Quality of Life survey, allowing analysis of marginalisation across the entire Gauteng province population.
• Only 0.3% of white youth (and 0.5% of Indian youth) showed signs of high marginalisation.

David Everatt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

• Gen. Alfred M. Gray Jr., who died on March 20, 2024, at the age of 95, was seen as a legend for his heroism in combat.
• But despite his military success, Gray, who went on to serve as the 29th commandant of the Marine Corps from 1987 to 1991, will always be associated with one of the darkest days in U.S. military history: the Beirut barracks bombing on Oct. 23, 1983.
• The terrorist attack killed more than 300 people, including 241 U.S. service personnel under Gray’s command, although he was stateside at the time of the attack.
• As a scholar currently doing research for a project on that attack, I can’t help but note that Gray’s death comes amid a surge of violence in Lebanon and at a time when U.S. troops stationed in the Middle East are again being targeted by Islamist groups funded by Iran.

Marines in Lebanon

Gray’s experience with U.S. involvement in Lebanon underscores the dangers American troops face when deployed to volatile areas. On June 4, 1981, he was assigned to command the 2nd Marine Division and all the battalions that went into a war-torn Lebanon from 1982 to 1984.

• It began on April 13, 1975, and, similar to the upsurge in violence in Lebanon now, it was fueled by events south of the country’s border.
• Palestinians expelled or fleeing from what became Israel in 1948 ended up as refugees in neighboring countries, including Lebanon.
• By the mid-1970s, over 20,000 PLO fighters were in Lebanon and launching attacks on Israel.
• In 1982, Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee, invaded Lebanon and occupied Beirut with the intention of destroying PLO forces.

Day of attack

• Minutes later, a similar attack took place in the French quarter, resulting in the deaths of 58 French paratroopers.
• To this day, this event remains the deadliest single-day attack for the United States Marine Corps since the battle of Iwo Jima in 1945.
• The Beirut barracks bombing was a personal affair for Gray; his troops were in Lebanon, and he had visited them just months before the attack.

After the bombing, Gray attended over 100 funerals of the service members killed. He also offered his resignation over the incident – the only senior officer to do so. His request was declined.

Lessons from 1983

• One could draw many parallels between the Beirut barracks bombing of 1983 and current events.
• In August 1982, President Ronald Reagan expressed his grave concern over Israel’s conduct in Lebanon and warned Israel about using American weaponry offensively.
• Forty years on, American troops in the Middle East remain a target for much the same reason.
• There is another parallel: Just as the group that claimed responsibility for the 1983 Beirut attack was being financed by Iran, so too today are the groups responsible for attacking U.S. bases across the Middle East.
• Spurred by failings involved in the 1983 bombing, Gray sought to reform the Marine Corps after the tragedy, with greater focus on intelligence-gathering and understanding enemy groups.

Mireille Rebeiz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

• He is on a secret mission to meet representatives of Britain’s ruling Labour party – including, he hopes, the recently elected prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald.
• The 38-year-old Matteotti, a tireless defender of workers’ rights, still hopes Mussolini can be stopped.
• For Matteotti, this new British government – the first to be led by Labour, although not as a majority – is a beacon of hope.

Four days in London

• Britain’s new prime minister was a working-class Scot who had made his way up via humble jobs and political activism.
• In contrast, Matteotti hailed from a wealthy family that owned 385 acres in the Polesine region of north-eastern Italy.

• The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.
• But something else may have troubled Mussolini about Matteotti’s visit to London – part of a European tour that also included stops in Brussels and Paris.

Death of a socialist

• He had reportedly been working on this speech day and night, studying data and checking numbers for many hours.
• This secret group, known as Ceka after the Soviet political police created to repress dissent, had been following Matteotti for weeks.
• The squad’s leader, US-born Amerigo Dumini, reputedly boasted of having previously killed several socialist activists.
• Socialist MPs, alerted by Matteotti’s wife, denounced the MP’s disappearance – but were not altogether surprised by it.
• For a few days, it appeared that the resulting public outrage – much of it aimed at Mussolini himself – might even bring down Italy’s government, spelling the death knell for fascism.

Why was Matteotti murdered?

• His death can be seen as one of the most consequential political assassinations of the 20th century.
• Yet for the Italian right, Matteotti is a ghost.
• Throughout her political career, Italy’s current prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, has hardly ever spoken about the historical crimes of fascists in Italy, and not once about the murder of Matteotti.
• The historical debate about the murder has also never reached a unanimous conclusion about who gave the order to kill Matteotti and why.

The LSE documents

• The story of how the documents came to be secreted away in the LSE library takes us back to London for another clandestine visit – this time by Gaetano Salvemini, an esteemed professor of modern history who fled Italy in November 1925.
• In December 1926, while still in London, Salvemini received the secret package which he soon passed on to the LSE.
• But they were driven by the conviction that these documents could one day prove beyond doubt that Mussolini had orchestrated Matteotti’s assassination.
• Salvemini may thus have considered the LSE a safe haven – and there the documents have remained ever since.

A voice from the dead

• Rather, the move allowed Mussolini to legislate unchallenged while the seats of the 123 MPs who had joined the rebellion were left vacant.
• Matteotti’s article, entitled “Machiavelli, Mussolini and Fascism”, was a response to an article published in the magazine’s June issue by Mussolini himself.
• The Italian prime minister’s translated essay about the Renaissance intellectual Niccolò Machiavelli had carried the provocative headline “The Folly of Democracy”.
• The article was widely commented on in the British press, which had been following the story of Matteotti’s murder almost daily.
• His funeral was rushed through very quickly, with the coffin being transported overnight in an attempt to prevent public gatherings.

The end of Italian democracy

• In a speech to parliament on January 3 1925, he took “political responsibility” for the murder while not admitting to ordering it.
• Mussolini’s speech ended with a rhetorical invitation to indict him – to a parliament now populated only by fascists.
• The speech signalled the end of Italian democracy.
• The nature of Mussolini’s involvement was little discussed in the wake of his execution in April 1945 and the end of the second world war.
• Was it the evidence of the Mussolini government’s corruption that he planned to reveal to the Italian parliament the day after his kidnap?

For you: more from our Insights series:
India elections: ‘Our rule of law is under attack from our own government, but the world does not see this’

History’s crisis detectives: how we’re using maths and data to reveal why societies collapse – and clues about the future

How a little-known clergyman studying worms by candlelight in the 1700s inspired Charles Darwin – but didn’t get the credit he deserved

To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. Subscribe to our newsletter.

• He has also received funding from the Fondazione Giacomo Matteotti to study the LSE documents.
• Gianluca Fantoni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.