Journal of Financial Stability

Decomposing systemic risk: the roles of contagion and common exposures

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, April 23, 2024
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Abstract

Key Points: 
    • Abstract
      We evaluate the effects of contagion and common exposure on banks? capital through
      a regression design inspired by the structural VAR literature and derived from the balance
      sheet identity.
    • Contagion can occur through direct exposures, fire sales, and market-based
      sentiment, while common exposures result from portfolio overlaps.
    • First, we document that contagion varies in time, with the highest levels
      around the Great Financial Crisis and lowest levels during the pandemic.
    • Our new framework complements
      traditional stress-tests focused on single institutions by providing a holistic view of systemic risk.
    • While existing literature presents various contagion narratives, empirical findings on
      distress propagation - a precursor to defaults - remain scarce.
    • We decompose systemic risk into three elements: contagion, common exposures, and idiosyncratic risk, all derived from banks? balance sheet identities.
    • The contagion factor encompasses both sentiment- and contractual-based elements, common exposures consider systemic
      aspects, while idiosyncratic risk encapsulates unique bank-specific risk sources.
    • Our empirical analysis of the Canadian banking system reveals the dynamic nature of contagion, with elevated levels observed during the Global Financial Crisis.
    • In conclusion, our model offers a comprehensive lens for policy intervention analysis and
      scenario evaluations on contagion and systemic risk in banking.
    • This
      notion of systemic risk implies two key components: first, systematic risks (e.g., risks related
      to common exposures) and second, contagion (i.e., an initially idiosyncratic problem becoming
      more widespread throughout the financial system) (see Caruana, 2010).
    • In this paper, we decompose systemic risk into three components: contagion, common exposures, and idiosyncratic risk.
    • First, we include contagion in three forms: sentiment-based contagion, contractual-based
      contagion, and price-mediated contagion.
    • In this context,
      portfolio overlaps create common exposures, implying that bigger overlaps make systematic
      shocks more systemic.
    • With the COVID-19 pandemic starting
      in 2020, contagion drops to all time lows, potentially related to strong fiscal and monetary
      supports.
    • That is, our
      structural model provides a framework for analyzing the impact of policy interventions and
      scenarios on different levels of contagion and systemic risk in the banking system.
    • This provides a complementary approach to
      seminal papers that took a structural approach to contagion, such as DebtRank Battiston et al.
    • More generally, the literature on networks and systemic risk started with Allen and Gale
      (2001) and Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
    • The matrix is structured as follows:
      1

      In our model, we do not distinguish between interbank liabilities and other types of liabilities.

    • In other words, we can and aim to estimate different degrees
      of contagion per asset class, i.e., potentially distinct parameters ?Ga .
    • For that, we build three major
      metrics to check: average contagion, average common exposure, and average idiosyncratic risk.
    • N i j

      et ,
      Further, we define the (N ?K) common exposure matrix as Commt = [A

      (20)

      et ]diag (?C
      ?L

      such that average common exposure reads,
      average common exposure =

      1 XX
      Commik,t .

    • N i j

      (22)

      20

      ? c ),

      The three metrics?average contagion, average common exposure, and average idiosyncratic risk?provide a comprehensive framework for understanding banking dynamics.

    • Figure 4 depicts the average level of risks per systemic risk channel: contagion risk, common exposure, and idiosyncratic risk.
    • Figure 4: Average levels of contagion (Equation (20)), common exposure (Equation (21)), and idiosyncratic risk
      (Equation (22)).
    • The market-based contagion is the contagion due to
      investors? sentiment, and the network is an estimate FEVD on volatility data.
    • For most of
      the sample, we find that contagion had a bigger impact on the variance than common exposures.

Transactional demand for central bank digital currency

Retrieved on: 
Thursday, April 18, 2024

Key Points: 

    The impact of regulatory changes on rating behaviour

    Retrieved on: 
    Tuesday, April 2, 2024
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    Abstract

    Key Points: 
      • Abstract
        We examine rating behaviour after the introduction of new regulations regarding Credit Rating
        Agencies (CRAs) in the European securitisation market.
      • There is empirical evidence of rating catering in the securitisation market in the pre-GFC period (He et al.,
        2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
      • Competition among
        CRAs could diminish ratings quality (Golan, Parlour, and Rajan, 2011) and promotes rating shopping by
        issuers resulting in rating inflation (Bolton et al., 2012).
      • This paper investigates the impact of the post-GFC regulatory changes in the European
        securitisation market.
      • In 2011, in addition to the creation of
        European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a regulatory and supervisory body for CRAs was
        introduced.
      • We examine how rating behaviours have changed in the European securitisation market after the
        introduction of these new regulations.
      • We utilise the existence of multiple ratings and rating agreements between
        CRAs to identify the existence of rating shopping and rating catering, respectively (Griffin et al., 2013; He
        et al., 2012; 2016).
      • We find that the regulatory changes have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest between issuers
        and CRAs in the structured finance market.
      • Rating catering, which is a direct consequence of issuer and
        CRA collusion, seems to have disappeared after the introduction of these regulations.
      • There is empirical evidence of rating catering in the securitisation market in
        the pre-GFC period (He et al., 2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
      • Competition among CRAs could diminish ratings quality (Golan, Parlour,
        and Rajan, 2011) and promotes rating shopping by issuers resulting in rating inflation (Bolton et
        al., 2012).
      • This paper investigates the impact of the post-GFC regulatory changes in the European
        securitisation market.
      • In 2011, in addition
        to the creation of European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a regulatory and
        supervisory body for CRAs was introduced.
      • We find that the regulatory changes have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest
        between issuers and CRAs in the structured finance market.
      • Rating catering, which is a direct
        consequence of issuer and CRA collusion, seems to have disappeared after the introduction of
        these regulations.
      • Investors who previously demanded higher spreads for rating agreements for a
        multiple rated tranche, did not consider the effect of rating harmony as a risk in the post-GFC
        period.
      • Regarding rating shopping, we find that the effectiveness of the changes has been limited,
        potentially for two reasons.
      • Additionally, we also find that rating over-reliance might still be an issue, especially
        Rating catering is a broad term and it can involve rating shopping.
      • They re-examine the rating shopping and rating
        catering phenomena in the US market by looking at the post-crisis period between 2009 and 2013.
      • Using 622 CDO tranches, they also observe the existence of rating shopping and the diminishing
        of the rating catering.
      • Firstly, our main focus is the EU?s CRA Regulation and its effectiveness in reducing
        rating inflation and rating over-reliance.
      • To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
        examine the effectiveness of the EU?s CRA regulatory changes on the investors? perception of
        rating inflation in the European ABS market.
      • Hence, the coverage and quality of our dataset constitutes significant addition
        to the literature and allows us to test the rating shopping and rating catering more authoritatively.
      • The following section reviews the literature
        on securitisation concerning CRAs and conflicts of interest, and outlines the regulatory changes
        introduced in the post-GFC period.
      • Firstly, ratings became ever more important as the Securities and
        Exchange Commission (SEC) 5 began heavily relying on CRA assessments for regulatory purposes
        (i.e.
      • the investment mandates that highlight rating agencies as the main benchmark for investment
        eligibility) (SEC, 2008; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Bolton et al., 2012).
      • issuers) as one of the main explanations for the rating inflation (He et al., 2011; 2012; Bolton
        et al., 2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
      • Bolton et al., (2012) demonstrate that competition
        promotes rating shopping by issuers, leading to rating inflation.
      • The last phase, CRA III, was implemented in mid-2013 and involves an additional
        set of measures on reducing transparency and rating over-reliance.
      • As mentioned above, rating inflation can be caused by rating shopping
        In order to be eligible to use the STS classification, main parties (i.e.
      • The higher the difference in the number of ratings for a
        given ABS tranche, the greater the risk of rating shopping.
      • Alternatively, the impact of the new
        regulations could be limited when it comes to reducing rating shopping.
      • This is because, firstly,
        the conflict of interest between securitisation parties is not necessarily the sole cause for the
        occurrence of rating shopping.
      • L is a set of variables (Multiple ratings, CRA reported, Rating agreement) that
        we utilise interchangeably to capture the rating shopping and rating catering behaviour.
      • Hence, issuers are incentivised to report the highest possible rating and
        ensure each additional rating matches the desired level.
      • All in all, our results suggest that
        the new stricter regulatory measures have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest and
        reducing rating inflation caused by rating catering.
      • Self-selection might be a concern in analysing the impact of the
        new measures and investors? response with regard to the rating inflation.
      • This
        result is in line with the earlier findings suggesting that regulatory changes have reduced investors?
        suspicion of rating inflation and increased trust of CRAs.
      • Conclusion
        Several regulatory changes were introduced in Europe following the GFC aimed at tackling
        conflicts of interest between issuers and CRAs in the ABS market.
      • Utilising a sample of 12,469
        ABS issued between 1998 and 2018 in the European market, this paper examined whether these
        changes have had any impact on rating inflations caused by rating shopping and rating catering
        phenomena.
      • We find that the
        effectiveness of the changes has been more limited on rating shopping potentially for two reasons.
      • Tranche Credit Rating is the rating reported for a tranche at launch.